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August 28, 1990 - the 240th day of 1990, 
but, more important to each of you, day 2 of 
NDC Course XLIV. 26 days since Iraqi forces 
swept into Kuwait and the Security Council 
acted under Article 39; 22 days since it 
declared - for only the third time ever, 
economic sanctions under Article 41; 3 days 
since Article 42 was invoked - only the 
second time with the full participation of the 
five Permanent Members. Within Canada, 24 
weeks since armed, masked Mohawks began 
defying Canadian law and attracting the 
attention - as well as much support - of the 
Canadian public to their longstanding 
grievances. Less than 3 months since 
elections - sometimes calm, sometimes not - 
in a spate of countries, not all used to 
democratic practices: Bulgaria and 
Czechoslovakia, Colombia and Peru, Burma 
and the Dominican Republic. 36 days until 
the unification of Germany. Not quite 3 
months until the concluding session of the 
Uruguay Round of the GATT; not quite 4 
months since the Bergen Conference affirmed 
the dangers of global warming. 
Exactly one year ago, Course XLIII first 
gathered in these buildings without the 
slightest expectation on the part of members 
or directing staff that they would observe 
together the conclusion of half a century of 
conflict (both real and anticipated) and witness 
the world's unpreparedness for the new age 
of interdependence. Not the end of history, 
but hopefully the beginning of the end of 
illusion, of ideology, of ignorance. You now 
gather wondering whether in days and weeks 
to come the latest manifestation of 
international outlawry will be contained 
successfully, whether in the process nations 
will record an unprecedented and significant 
accomplishment in community building and 
support for the rule of law. 
Not often, in all recorded time have there 
been such hinges, such diversions, such 
rendezvous. Not always has humankind 
wisely made the transition. 
1990 is not yet the beginning of the end 
of a century. It is, however, an opportunity to 
end an era - one that began with the Russo- 
Japanese war of 1904-05. An era which will 
be regarded as long as historic records are 
kept as the bloodiest, most destructive, most 
self-seeking ever. If the next era is to be 
more humane, more environmentally 
sustainable, more just, some basic balances 
must be understood, and must be observed. 
We live in an increasingly crowded, 
environmentally degraded planet, where 
margins of error become ever narrower, where 
the only space with a growth margin is 
intellectual space. We are mesmerized by 
measurements, almost always quantitative; 
almost never qualitative. 
A complicating factor in our quest for 
adjustment is that the span of human 
attention has never been long. Now, it is 
increasingly shaped by television units: one 
hour programs, one week intervals. And, as 
scientists develop the means increasingly to 
measure accurately faster speeds and shorter 
time periods, our interest is captured by 
precise, almost momentary imagery: micro- 
seconds, millimetres. In democratic regimes, 
where electoral periods range from two to six 
years, both politicians and businessmen find it 
inconvenient to think, plan, or act in longer 
segments. Fiscal years and electoral 
mandates become, of necesity, the maximum 
fraction of time for analysis and reflection. 
Events of longer duration are ruled out. Yet 
they are meaningful nevertheless. Rare is the 
kind of opportunity that has been presented to 
you for these next 10 months to observe, to 
challenge, to consider. Far rarer still does 
that opportunity come at a moment when so 
many a priori assumptions have dissolved, 
when so many new structures and processes 
wait to be designed. 
The history of humankind is the proud 
record of many brilliant accomplishments: the 
arithmetic concept of zero; Mozart's piano 
concertos; the courageous voyages of 
exploration of Cabot and Frobisher, of Cartier 
and Champlain; the discovery of insulin by 
Banting and Best; the political symmetry of 
the United States Constitution; the stunning 
force of a novel of Gabdel Garcia Marquez. 
That same history is as well the bleak 
account of stupidity and savagery, of 
hypocrisy and chicanery. Barbarity has never 
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lacked its proponents, acting always for the 
greater glory of something - God, sovereignty, 
ideology, markets. Examples abound: the 
Children's Crusade, the Inquisition, the slave- 
trade, Hitlerism, Stalinism. 
Arrogance and ignorance, daring and 
resolve; these have been ingredients of 
humankind's quest for permanence. They 
have led to technological achievements 
beyond the imagination of any prophets, and 
standards of living in the industrialized nations 
more comfortable than any in history. They 
have also destroyed the tropical rain forests, 
advanced alarmingly the African deserts, and 
engineered a nuclear Damocles' sword that 
places in jeopardy still the very continuance of 
humankind. 
Few of these accomplishments - be they 
positive or negative - are measurable as 
constants on a monthly or even annual scale. 
How, even, does one measure the 
comparable cost-benefit ratio of a growth 
economy and a polluted environment, of a 
functioning deterrent to war and the threat of 
a nuclear holocaust, of protected northern 
industries and growing Third-World anguish? 
Are we able even to discern major trends in 
time to modify them? Can the world develop 
the equivalent of time-lapse photography to 
permit decision-makers to observe the long- 
term effects of seemingly anodyne activities 
and actions? How can we project into the 
future the effects of activities not yet 
undertaken? 
Brock Chisholm, the Canadian who was 
the first Director-General of the World Health 
Organization, argued that the ability to see 
ahead, and to plan accordingly, was an 
ingredient of maturity. Infants, he said, may 
anticipate their next meal, but no more. Pre- 
schoolers can look forward to special events 
like birthdays or Christmas. Adolescents are 
already planning their life-work, and mature 
adults take steps to contribute to a preferred 
future for their own offspring. 
It is the transfer of this forward view from 
the individual to the community as a whole 
that is now needed. But how to attract 
attention in the first instance? 
There's not much excitement in 
measuring the degradation of prairie soils, or 
in computing the epidemiology of infant 
mortality in South Asia. And particularly not 
for politicians, because the variation in any 
four-year period is minor. Who, then, is to 
speak for the future, for Brock Chisholm's 
great-grandchildren? In the past century, 
those prairie soils have lost fully one-half of 
their nutrient content. Who was responsible? 
Do we have any sort of mechanism to ensure 
that that rate of deterioration is not 
continuing? 
Looking forward for a period of one or 
two decades is understandably difficult for 
governments accountable at the end of four- 
or five-year periods. Nevertheless, we must 
never forget that the greatest of statesmen 
kept their eyes firmly on distant horizons. 
Churchill and Roosevelt, in the depths of 
World War 11, looked ahead. In August 1941, 
aboard HMS Prince of Wales anchored in 
Placentia Bay, Newfoundland, they issued the 
Atlantic Charter which called for post-war 
political and economic objectives which, at 
San Francisco in 1945, were melded into the 
United Nations Charter: renunciation of force, 
political self-determination, economic 
collaboration, a system of general security, 
disarmament. Not all of it yet realized, yet 
boldly planned nevertheless. So well planned 
in fact that Chapter VII, now suddenly 
rediscovered by the USA and the USSR, may 
prove to be as adequate as international 
lawyers have argued all along. For the first 
time since February 16, 1946, the Security 
Council may turn to the Military Staff 
Committee. 
The summer of 1945 that gave birth to 
the United Nations was the beginning of the 
nuclear age, a step by humankind into an era 
which it did not understand then and scarcely 
comprehends now. An era qualitatively so 
distinct from the past that one understands 
the confusion and the contradictions that have 
permeated military planning, and which leave 
the world now quite unprepared for what is 
happening and will happen. 
Contradictions in today's world are not 
just nuclear. Our unwillingness, perhaps our 
inability, to utilize our resources for the benefit 
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of human beings has placed us in a world of 
extraordinary discrepancies between luxury 
and depravity. A world of unimaginable 
suffering which has produced at this moment 
as many as 60 million refugees of one sort or 
another worldwide; life expectancies of less 
than 45 years as in Sierra Leone or Guinea 
(43 and 44 respectively); infant mortality 
rates in excess of 150 per 1,000 in Mali (159) 
or Afghanistan (162), compared with 5 in 
Finland or 6 in Canada; per capita GNP of 
US$150 per year as in Bhutan and Zaire, 
compared with US$21.3 thousand in 
Switzerland or US$18.5 thousand in the 
United States. A world of tumult and unrest, 
one which promises much but betrays often. 
A period which has been compared to the 
13th century when chivalry flowered even as 
the Inquisition was introduced as a barbaric 
instrument of legal process. That century 
included Magna Carta, the Cologne Cathedral, 
and Genghis Khan. There are major 
differences, however, between then and now. 
Armies in the 13th century were equipped 
with swords, not nuclear or chemical 
weapons; terrorists in the Middle Ages had 
access neither to plastic explosives nor to 
large airplanes in which to detonate them; 
this planet 700 years ago faced no immediate 
challenge to its carrying capacity or to its 
wholesomeness; that world was a world of 
immediacies - of local economies and largely 
local awareness - no TV, no FAX, no 
satellites, no computers. 
You begin this week a period of 
exploration, study and reflection in 
circumstances as well designed and as 
potentially challenging as any that can be 
conceived. I envy you the opportunity. 
Where should one begin when looking at 
this confusing, still very-dangerous world? I 
invite you to view it with me from four 
different perspectives: 
I - The Physical Environment, 
II - The Human Environment, 
III - The Economic Environment, and 
IV - The Military Environment. 
If any of you are still in the room at the end 
of all that, I'll attempt some conclusions. 
ITEM - THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT 
It is no surprise, I hope, to anyone in 
this room to be told that the human race has 
been living off its capital for millennia. The 
extent to which we are diminishing that base 
came sharply into focus in 1987. We learned, 
for example, that the earth's ozone layer had 
decreased by 5% in only 7 years ('79 to '86). 
We have learned since that emissions of 
greenhouse gases have reached alarming 
proportions. An estimated 6 to 9 billion 
tonnes of carbon are released annually into 
the atmosphere, overwhelmingly from the 20% 
of the population who live in the industrialized 
countries. 
One of the globe's most precious and 
most vital commodities is soil. It is 
disappearing at a frightening rate, making a 
mockery of the phrase "dirt cheap". Several 
forces are at work leading to this result. One 
is drought - most evident in the Sahel region 
of Africa and, more recently, in vast tracts of 
South-West Africa. Another is the unceasing 
demand for firewood in developing countries 
which depletes forests and encourages soil 
erosion. These two phenomena together 
contribute to desertification. A third negative 
force takes the form of improper farming 
practices, this as much in the industrialized 
countries as in the South. A fourth, again 
evident in both North and South, is urban 
sprawl. Worldwide, the Brundtland 
Commission found, arable land is declining by 
6 million hectares per year - equivalent to four 
Jamaicas. 
Let me endeavour to transform those 
statistics into more recognizable form. 
Canada occupies the second largest land 
mass of any country in the world and is one 
of the world's major agricultural producers. 
Yet the Canada Land Inventory reveals that 
only 11 % of Canadian land is capable of any 
form of agriculture, less than 5% capable of 
producing crops, and less than one half of 1% 
categorized as Class One land with no 
agricultural limitations. How big is 0.5%? 
About the size of Denmark. Environment 
Canada's Dr. E.W. Manning has calculated 
that on a clear day, a person standing on the 
CN Tower in Toronto is able to see with the 
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naked eye 37% of Canada's Class One 
agricultural land. 
Soil degradation and new soil formation 
alike are both slow-moving events, difficult to 
measure. How does one make these 
processes subject to measurement? How 
does one persuade often-illiterate populations 
in developing countries, and equally-often 
uninterested populations in the industrialized 
countries, that the future of all of us is at 
peril, the quality of life of all planetary 
inhabitants deteriorating, even though at a 
tortoise-like pace? 
How does one commit a populace to the 
steps that must be taken now to avoid 
irremedial damage? A special report of the 
Canadian Senate's Standing Committee on 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry stated in 
1984, referring to soil deterioration, "Canada 
is facing the most serious agricultural crisis in 
its history and unless action is taken quickly, 
this country will lose a major portion of its 
agricultural capability." In 1990, 6 years later, 
that report remains outstanding. 
Closely associated with rich soils in a 
healthy organic and synergistic complex are 
forests and fresh water. Their continued 
health cannot be presumed. The Brandt 
Commission in 1979 was one of the first to 
draw attention to the massive amounts of 
forest loss. It estimated that forest cover had 
decreased from 25% to 20% of the earth's 
surface over the previous 20 years. Every 
year throughout the Third World an area of 
forest is destroyed equal to one half of the 
United Kingdom, or equal to the size of 
Washington State. These losses - some 16 
to 20 million hectares a year according to the 
best available estimates, are now realized to 
be nearly 50% higher than was thought only 
10 years ago. The speed of forest depletion 
is staggering. Thailand lost one-fourth of its 
forest cover in a 10-year period; Costa Rica 
lost one-third in 10 years; Ivory Coast lost 
one-third in 8 years. 
Forest depletion takes place as a result of 
several activities: poorly managed industrial 
logging; conversion to agricultural use, often 
by primitive, shifting slash-and-burn 
techniques; fuelwood gathering; aver-grazing. 
It is estimated that close to one billion cubic 
metres of wood are harvested for fuel each 
year in the tropical zone. This rate will 
increase in lock-step with population increases 
because there is no econornically 
advantageous fuel in sight for the foreseeable 
future. The Brundtland Commission estimated 
that in the tropical areas today 10 trees are 
cut down for every one that is planted. In 
Africa, that ratio is 29 to 1. 
Fresh water is critical both to agricultural 
productivity and to forest growth. Natural 
phenomena such as drought or flood have for 
millennia led to tragic consequences. Drought 
is a primary cause of desertification in the 
Sahelian region. In Sudan, the desert has 
extended by a 90- to 100-kilometre belt 
across the entire country in just 15 years 
according to UNEP, the UN Environment 
Programme. Over the past 50 years the 
Sahara has swallowed 650,000 square 
kilometres of former grazing lands, an area 
the size of Manitoba. In 7 years, the water 
level in Lake Nasser, behind the Nile River 
dam at Aswan, dropped 60 feet. 
In a preliminary report on Canadian 
water resources made available in late 1986, 
the Science Council of Canada stated: 
"Evidence of a looming environmental crisis 
indicates a scale and depth of disaster far 
exceeding any met by earlier generations." It 
argues that "The availability of water will be 
recognized as the key determinant of 
economic and environmental health; its 
absence a pressing threat to national security 
and well-being." The report catalogues the 
water shortage now faced in various parts of 
Canada. And it forecasts, on a global basis, 
that by the year 2000, 3 billion people (one 
half of the then world's population) will have 
inadequate supplies of water in terms either of 
quality or quantity. 
In this country of widely varying seasonal 
temperatures, it is well to remember that the 
difference in average temperatures between 
the worst ice age of the past 100,000 years 
and today is only 5 to 8 degrees Celcius. 
The range of warming now considered as 
possible by reputable scientists beginning to 
examine these phenomena is from 1.5 to 4.5 
degrees Celcius in the next 30 to 50 years. 
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The margin of tolerance of our atmosphere is 
very narrow. How welcome, therefore, was 
the decision of the United States Government 
in late June to reverse its earlier stand 
refusing to join Canada and European 
countries in offering financial assistance to 
developing countries as they pursue non-CFC 
policies. 
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ITEM - THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT 
This item in my catalogue of indicators 
of the state of the world not only concerns 
people, it is people: a lot of people. On 
July 11, 1987 the world's population passed 
the 5 billion mark. In the 3 years since then, 
a net growth of another 300 million has taken 
place. Nor is the rate of growth slowing. 
UNFPA projects the world population in the 
year 2000 to be 6.251 million; in 2025, to be 
8.467 million - 260 million more than earlier 
predictions. 
In August 1984, in Mexico City, the 
World Population Conference convened its 
second decennial meeting. That event 
precipitated a number of studies and analyses 
of a current and a projected nature. These 
are now proving to be on the low side. Not 
for the first time. 
From pre-history until about 1000 AD, 
the world's population did not increase by 
much. In earliest times, life was so 
precarious, and food supplies so unreliable, 
that a rough balance obtained between births 
and deaths notwithstanding an undoubtedly 
high fertility rate. The introduction of 
agricultural practices about 8000 BC lent a 
greater certainty to food supply but was for a 
long time largely offset by recurring crises of 
other natures - plague, war, etc. As the 
figure shows, population growth was modest 
for many centuries - from about 300 million at 
the time of the birth of Christ to some 800 
million in the mid-18th century. The doubling 
period was about 1,500 years. An equally 
important phenomenon is the fact that the rate 
of growth was approximately the same in all 
regions of the world. 
From about 1850 onwards, growth 
accelerated immensely. Mortality decreased 
with the advent of science and technology. 
The next doubling period was reduced by 
90%, the world required only 150 years to 
grow from 800 million to 1.7 billion in 1900. 
That acceleration has continued. By 1950, 
the figure had reached 2.5 billion; by 1987, 
5 billion. Doubling, that once had taken 1,500 
years, had now been accomplished in 37. 
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Growth figures of this magnitude are 
difficult to digest. They work out to an annual 
increment of a little more than 100 million 
persons. One hundred million is about the 
population of Bangladesh. From now to the 
turn of the century, then, the world's 
population will grow by the equivalent of one 
new Bangladesh every year. 
Since 1950, another important distinction 
has become apparent. The longstanding, 
roughly parallel, growth rates between 
industrialized and developing countries 
ceased. From 1750 to 1850 the two groups 
were not that far apart: 0.6% annual growth 
rate for the nations of Europe, North America 
and Japan, 0.4% for Africa, Asia, and Latin 
America. Each group eased upwards in the 
next century from 1850 to 1950; 0.9% and 
0.6% respectively. From 1950 onwards, the 
change has been startling. Between 1950 
and 1970, the growth rates increased and 
reversed. Accepted projections distribute the 
population for the year 2000 - 6.25 billion - as 
4.95 billion for the developing countries, 1.3 
billion for the industrialized countries. 
As the developing countries share of 
world population grew, their share of 
production dropped: from 44% in 1800 to 
19% a century later and to 17% in 1950. In 
1980, the production share had risen to 21%, 
but the population share was 75%. 
Another comparison between North and 
South is equally salient. The current size of 
those developing countries now at the 
threshold of industrialization and in the infancy 
of self-government is immensely larger than 
was the case for the northern countries at a 
comparative moment in their history. India is 
now 853 million, Indonesia - 181 million, 
Nigeria - 113 million, Mexico - 89 million. In 
1800, by comparison, France was about 30 
million, Britain 10 million. In 1850, the United 
States was about 24 million, Japan 30 million. 
The challenges to contemporary 
developing country governments are thus 
incomparably greater than were those to the 
now industrialized countries at an equivalent 
time in their history. Not only are populations 
several-fold larger but instant communications 
reveal to the poor the contrast of living 
standards with the better off. In all countries, 
North and South, governmentally imposed 
curtailments of freedom have followed on 
population growth; zoning laws, emission 
standards, and water and land use restrictions 
are among those well known to everyone in 
this room. Authoritarian measures in 
countries with populations much greater than 
Canada's are not, therefore, entirely without 
precedent. Nor should we be surprised if 
they increase, as they will, even in the 
democracies. The challenge to democracies 
everywhere is to ensure that those restraints 
be chosen wisely and administered justly. It 
is a formidable challenge. 
The carrying capacity of the Planet Earth 
is not of infinite proportions. The earth's 
ability to provide food will be a critical control 
factor if population increases are not 
restrained in other ways. 
The International Food Policy Research 
Institute released a significant study in 1986 
which projected a year 2000 scenario based 
upon trade, production, and consumption 
statistics in 105 developing countries relating 
to the basic food staples: cereals, roots and 
tubers, pulses, groundnuts, plantains and 
bananas. The IFPRI report projects a turn of 
the century annual Third World production 
shortfall in basic food staples of 70 million 
metric tonnes. This shortfall will have to be 
made up of imports from the industrialized 
countries. By way of comparison, Canada's 
total exports of food and food products in 
1987 was some 30 million metric tonnes. 
Population pressures and imbalances 
create shock waves which travel far from the 
point of origin. Byzantium realized that 6-1/2 
centuries ago as Ottoman bands swept out of 
the Asian steppes, capturing Galipoli on the 
European side of the Hellespont in 1353. On 
July 12, 1987 ripples of shock waves rolled 
up on the southern coast of Nova Scotia as 
much more peaceful strangers appeared on 
the streets of Charlesville, N.S. Today, 
worldwide, the number of "environmental 
refugees", those fleeing natural circumstances, 
is estimated to be 10 million and growing. An 
immediate destination is often the nearest city. 
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In 1960, there were three cities in Africa 
with populations of more than 500,000. 
Today there are 28. Worldwide, mega-cities 
are overwhelmingly in the South. Of the 25 
cities in the world with a current population of 
more than 7 million, 16 are in developing 
countries, including the largest, Mexico City, at 
18.1 million. By 2000, Mexico City is 
projected to grow to 26.3 million - the 
population of all Canada - and 45 of the 60 
largest cities will be in the South, 18 of them 
larger than 10 million. 
Faced with numbers of this magnitude, 
the provision of basic services on an equitable 
basis becomes absolutely impossible. Squalor 
and depravity increase. Political instability 
grows. And the future is placed in jeopardy. 
By 2000, 51.2% of the world's population will 
be urban. And that population will be young. 
Half of all people alive at the turn of the 
century will be under the age of 25. In the 
developing countries, 35% of the total 
population will be under 14. In ever- 
increasing numbers these youths find 
themselves on the streets: abandoned, 
uneducated, unemployed, alienated from any 
societal norms, without any loyalties except to 
their own gang, and - increasingly - with easy 
access to rapid-firing weapons. 
The Independent Commission on 
International Humanitarian Issues reported: 
"The fate of the street generation is 
inseparable from the uncertain fate of cities. 
Bursting or decaying, they were never built 
with the needs of children in mind. Today, 
the notion of man as the measure of all 
things has long vanished from urban life, and 
huge urban agglomerations have become 
increasingly inhuman and unmanageable." 
One hundred years after Dickens, the 
phenomenon of street children has returned in 
numbers far in excess of anything known to 
Oliver Twist. 
The reaction of young persons facing a 
future without hope is predictable. Which is 
not to say that governments are wise 
predictors. Current events in Gaza and the 
occupied territories of the West Bank provide 
ample evidence. 
ITEM - THE ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT 
A decade ago, most references to 
economic issues still utilized a national - or, at 
most, regional - perspective: the Canadian 
economy, the Japanese economy, the 
European economy. 
During the 1980s, awareness deepened 
of the "world economy." The World Bank, in 
its 1986 World Development Report, stated 
that "the world economy is in an uneasy and 
unsettled state." Paul Volcker, near the 
conclusion of his term as Chairman of the 
United States Federal Reserve Board, testified 
that the world economy suffered from a 
"massive international disequilibrium." Peter 
Drucker, the highly respected management 
consultant, wrote in "Foreign Affairs" in 1987: 
"From now on any country - but also any 
business, especially a large one - that wants 
to prosper will have to accept that it is the 
world economy that leads and that domestic 
economic policies will succeed only if they 
strengthen, or at least do not impair, the 
country's international competitive position." 
The same opinion had earlier been stated by 
Robert Hormats, a New York investment 
banker, who wrote in 1986 that "More than at 
any time in this century, US economic well- 
being depends on conditions abroad." 
But are national political leaders paying 
attention? UNCTAD's 1986 Annual Report 
stated: "In the 1980s, countries' policies, on 
the whole, have been framed without regard 
to their international consequences." 
Long-held conventional views, often 
among central bankers, are slow to disappear. 
The cherished belief that the major economic 
powers are able to act with impunity 
independently of one another did not begin to 
give way substantially until the late 1970swith 
the birth of the annual Western Economic 
Summits and the structure they fashioned for 
the broad coordination of economic policies. 
This group was much more tightly knit, for 
example, than the OECD. Still more was 
needed, however, to persuade decision- 
makers and publics of the mutual vulnerability 
of national economies. The collapse of oil 
prices, the sudden impact of debt burdens, 
and the financial crises of a number of 
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developing countries brought the message 
home. The economic health of the Big Seven 
was seen to be very much a factor of 
economic performance in far-away places. 
The inability of the developing countries, 
particularly in Latin America, to maintain their 
imports from the United States resulted in the 
loss, directly and indirectly, of more than one 
and a third million US jobs in the period 
1980-84, according to the US Overseas 
Development Council. US sales to Latin 
America dropped 26% between 1981 and 
1986 -- Latin America could not afford to buy 
goods because it was servicing its debt. 
Since 1983, the Latin American debtor 
countries have paid out US$191 billion in 
interest. 
In a 7-year period of the past decade, 
stagnant and diminishing economies in the 
developing countries reduced Canadian export 
revenues by CAD$24 billion, with a loss of 
130,000 Canadian jobs. 
Interconnectedness and interdependence 
have suddenly become acceptable terms. 
Assumption of economic responsibility, 
however, remains an elusive goal, one 
repugnant to the short-term political interests, 
or abilities, of all too many governments. In 
these circumstances, measurements take on 
different meanings. 
It took a period of only 3 years for the 
United States to change from the world's 
largest creditor to the world's largest debtor. 
As America's federal deficit soared, spurred 
by huge military expenditures, interest rates 
climbed and investment capital flooded in. 
Coincidentally, those same interest rates kept 
up the value of the US dollar in international 
markets and acted indirectly as an immense 
stimulus to foreign manufacturers. The US 
merchandise trade deficit sank to record 
numbers, leading to huge losses in sales and 
drops in employment, and is now a major 
irritant in American relations with several 
countries, principally Japan and India. In one 
of the great ironies of this period, one 
unthought of only 10 years earlier, India has 
now been selected as the country whose 
trade policies are most offensive to the US, 
and has been singled out for "super 301" 
retaliation. 
Meanwhile, the outstanding debt of the 
developing countries has soared, exceeding 
1.2 trillion US$ in 1989. Of even more critical 
importance, the debt service ratio climbed 
from 16.1% to 21.9% between 1980 and 
1985. In the aggregate, this eased to 17% by 
1989. Aggregate figures are of little solace to 
individual governments, however. In Africa, 
the ratio climbed from 17.7% in 1981 to 
31.1% in 1990; in the same period, the fuel- 
exporting nations went from 11.4% to 24.6%, 
and the 15 most heavily indebted countries 
remain as they were earlier at approximately 
40%. Of every $10 earned in foreign 
exchange, $4 is earmarked for interest 
payments. The most welcome Baker initiative, 
which marked a major reversal of US foreign 
economic policies, was abandoned in favour 
of the Brady Plan, which itself is desperately 
slow in gaining support and implementation. 
Progress has been reached so far in only 
three cases: Mexico, Costa Rica, and the 
Philippines. 
One of the structural factors responsible 
for the immense trade and fiscal imbalances 
is the continuing deficit positions of a number 
of industrialized countries. Gross US federal 
debt passed through the US$1 trillion 
threshold for the first time in history in 1981. 
In the next 5 years, it more than doubled, to 
more than US$2,112 billion. Budget deficits 
as a percentage of GNP have shown a 
disturbing tendency to increase in 5 of the 7 
summit countries in this decade. In only 
Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany 
are they lower than in 1979. While the 
largest deficit is, of course, in the United 
States, far and away the largest in percentage 
terms is that of Italy at 10.6% in 1988. 
Canada that year was 2.6%. The United 
States was 2.1%. 
A major challenge to governments is the 
fact that capital markets have become global, 
linked by sophisticated computer and satellite- 
communication networks. As the earth 
rotates, traders in Tokyo, Singapore, Frankfurt, 
London, New York, Toronto, and San 
Francisco buy and sell all forms of financial 
paper: equities, debentures, currencies 
themselves. The market is fuelled by 
immense pools of institutional savings. 
Private pension funds in the OECD countries 
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now exceed US$1.4 billion and will double in 
the next 5 years. In any 24-hour period, the 
volume of trade in the world's currency 
markets alone is some US$430 billion. Of 
that total, less than 10% is related to 
conventional activities, i.e., buying or 
producing something. The balance of more 
than 90% - some US$390 billion - is 
speculative activity. 
One observer has commented: "At its 
worst, this new global financial order is 
accountable to no one. Sharp-eyed young 
technicians handle billions of dollars of money 
each day, often without really knowing to 
whom that money belongs. They are 
intensely profit-oriented and arbitrary, and the 
money they control can be subject to wild 
flights or harrowing crashes based on rumours 
and hunches." The 1984 failure of the 
Continental Illinois Bank - which led to the 
then largest single government bail-out of a 
private sector enterprise in history (US$4.5 
billion) - began with a rumour on the 
commercial paper market in Tokyo. The 
rumour was unfounded but, by the time the 
bank opened for business in Chicago hours 
later, its deposit base was a shambles. In 
1988, the Brady Commission on US market 
mechanisms included a recommendation for 
"circuit breakers" to intervene as wild 
fluctuations pick up momentum from one stock 
exchange to another. 
license fees unless their own export position 
improves. In the face of protectionism and 
low commodity prices, that's not a likely event. 
In gross financial transfers, the net 
balance is not from North to South as the 
popular impression has it. In 1989, the net 
flow was the reverse - in the sum of US$50 
billion (up 10 billion from the previous year). 
That means that the impoverished countries of 
the world are enriching the wealthy countries 
at the rate of some one billion dollars each 
week. 
If economic interdependence was a 
fuzzy term to any of you prior to this morning, 
that figure may sharpen the image 
somewhat - even reverse your conceptions of 
who depends on whom. 
Unregulated, massive transfers of capital 
(not all of it derived from legitimate 
activities), roller-coaster commodity pricing 
induced in some instances by government 
subsidy policies, and trade barriers of a 
number of kinds have combined to produce 
the current incidence of massive, 
unsustainable, imbalances. They cannot be 
eased without widespread international 
cooperation. The importance of well- 
performing economies in the developing 
countries must not be overlooked in this 
scheme. Through much of the decade of the 
1980s, Canada sold more to the LDCs than it 
did to either Japan or all the members of the 
European Economic Community. United 
States sales to the developing countries are 
estimated now to support two million American 
jobs. Yet developing countries cannot 
indefinitely buy goods and pay interest and 
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ITEM - THE MILITARY ENVIRONMENT 
The environment with the least accurate 
title in this state-of-the-world catalogue 
features weapons and weaponry. Ironically, 
this topic could quality for consideration under 
the economics section. This for two reasons. 
First, an increasing number of experts 
concedes that there exists no military purpose 
for nuclear weapons of any kind; that their 
role is political, including deterrence. Cost 
thus assumes a new importance. One of the 
great ironies of this century, one not unknown 
in previous times, is that current disarmament 
activities are the consequence more of 
economic, than military or political 
circumstance. Second, notwithstanding recent 
downward trends, the economic value of the 
defence industry and of international trade in 
weapons and weapons-systems is so large 
that it reduces to comparative unimportance 
many other sectoral activities. The Palme 
Commission stated that total military spending 
in 1982, worldwide, exceeded US$650 billion. 
That's more than US$1 million a minute. A 
joint British and American study published in 
1987 indicated that military expenditures had 
by then reached US$1.7 million a minute. 
A lucrative portion of the international 
arms trade is from North to South. Modern, 
automatic-firing, small-calibre weapons are 
now so plentiful and so universally distributed 
that they have become a routine tool of trade 
for terrorists and common criminals alike: 
Uzis, Kalishnikovs, M-16s all abound. In 
Colombia, private killers flourish as a growth 
industry: the contract price can be as low as 
US$100. The value of arms transferred in 
commercial or official inter-governmental trade, 
all of it in conventional armaments, in the 
period 1980-84 was US$69.7 billion, with the 
United States continuing its long-held lead as 
the world's major arms exporter (39.70/6 of the 
total in that period, compared to 31.8% for the 
USSR and 9.1% for France). Sales dropped 
dramatically in 1985, by $5.5 billion, and the 
order of the major vendors changed. USSR - 
first, UK - second, USA - third. The value of 
the thriving underground trade in arms is 
impossible to calculate with any accuracy. 
The Third World's share of reported global 
military expenditures (which includes, of 
course, more than arms purchases) rose from 
3% in 1955 to 20% in 1982 according to 
SIPRI, but has since fallen off somewhat. As 
developing countries have begun their own 
armaments industries, their capacity to meet 
their needs domestically has reduced their 
offshore purchases. 
The defence industry in the United 
States is now so large and so geographically 
widespread that it is a critically important and 
structural segment of the US economy. A 
major cut-back in defence expenditures would 
have severe disruptive effects on the economy 
and contribute significantly to a rise in 
unemployment. For that reason, led by Long 
Island politicians, the Congress last year 
forced the US Navy to buy more F-14s than it 
wanted. The current lively debate about 
"peace dividends" is much more reflective of 
economic circumstance than it is of physical 
security. 
The same general circumstances obtain 
in France, Israel, The Republic of South 
Africa, and to a lesser extent in a number of 
other industrialized countries. Israel, for 
example, manufactures a good deal of its own 
weapons requirements. It engages as well in 
a flourishing export trade. So much so that a 
mid-1980s Israeli study called this a crucial 
factor in the country's economy. The value of 
Israeli arms exports was then more than 
US$1 billion a year, representing nearly 20% 
of all Israeli manufactured exports, and some 
10% of all exports, according to a study by 
the Jaffee Centre for Strategic Studies at Tel 
Aviv University. 
The impact of government defence 
expenditures in Canada is much more of an 
economic and political issue than it is military. 
The CF-18 maintenance contract is a case in 
point. 
Into the developing world from a number 
of northern sources are sold sophisticated 
weapons and weapons systems which are not 
needed, which cannot be maintained, and 
which cannot be used effectively. These are 
sold willingly and purchased eagerly, often on 
attractive credit terms and - in the case of the 
United States and the Soviet Union - often as 
part of aid programs. Statistics provided by 
the United States' Department of Defence 
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reveal that in the decade 1971 to 1980, US 
weapons were sold and transferred to 130 
different nations. One of the results is the 
current impasse in the Persian Gulf. Iran was 
turned into a formidable regional military 
power by the United States. Iraq was next in 
line but the lead was taken by the USSR with 
the strong supporting role of France. It is 
now Saudi Arabia's turn to be armed to the 
teeth with modern weaponry. 
In the East-West dimension, a major 
focus of attention remains, and properly, on 
nuclear issues. Even before the remarkable 
changes in Eastern Europe in recent months, 
technological advances had already placed in 
grave doubt the viability of the current NATO 
strategy of flexible response. 
The INF treaty recognized that second- 
strike capability in both intermediate and 
strategic terms had become imperilled 
because technology is now providing to 
warheads guidance systems so accurate, and 
delivery vehicles with flight times so short, that 
counter-force targeting strategies threaten the 
survivability of land-based missiles. This is a 
critical change because ICBMs remain a 
major element in the United States strategic 
triad and the preponderant portion of the 
Soviet Union's strategic arsenal. The 
accuracy of the new Trident 11 D-5 SLBM 
(with a CEP - circular error probable - rating 
of well under 200 metres, less than half the 
CEP of the current Trident IC-4 SLBM) places 
in jeopardy Soviet ICBM silos and could, 
under cold war scenarios, force the USSR to 
move from a second-strike to a first-strike 
posture: a chilling prospect. NATO, of 
course, based on the imbalance of 
conventional forces, has always retained a 
first-use option. That option was expressly 
confirmed at Kananaskis in May of this year 
as an adjunct to the debate on modernization 
of theatre weapons, but started to dissolve at 
the CSCE discussions in Copenhagen in 
June. As Eastern European countries 
abandon their authoritarian regimes and seek 
the early withdrawal of Soviet troops, as CFE 
discussions proceed, as a START treaty holds 
to schedule, and as chemical weapons and 
verification agreements are concluded, the 
challenge to leaders and advisers to act 
imaginatively but prudently is brea1V%iaW1n9. 
Strategic weapons which cannot survive 
a first strike are of no value. Weapons which 
are high-value targets and which are not 
survivable are of a bilateral negative worth for 
they are, by definition, destabilizing. 
Destabilizing weapons reduce, not enhance, 
security. This, fortunately, has now sunk into 
the realization of all but the most ideologically 
hardened in each superpower, and as a result 
START should be signed later this year. 
As strategic inventories diminish, 
intermediate and chemical weapons disappear, 
conventional force reductions begin, and the 
thorny issue of ALCMs and SLCMs is 
addressed, the problem which I have always 
regarded as the most urgent - theatre nuclear 
weapons - continues to resist resolution, 
although the LANCE retirement decision is a 
welcome one. Lacking any credible military- 
use scenario, opposed vehemently by 
successive German governments, and 
packaged in such compact, easily 
transportable fashion as to fascinate and 
attract terrorists and bootleggers alike, tactical 
weapons in most deployments have long 
placed in issue a series of diabolical 
problems: 
1.The command and control capabilities of 
forces armed and trained to employ 
conventional or nuclear weapons 
interchangeably. 
2.The pre-siting close to the central European 
frontiers of nuclear mines which retain 
advantage only if detonated in the earliest 
minutes following any penetration by hostile 
forces. This is the "use them or lose them" 
syndrome. 
3. The timely ability to detect and adequately 
respond to incoming, accurately guided 
warheads with flight times of 10 to 12 
minutes. 
4. The severability of theatre nuclear usage 
from strategic retaliation. This is the result of 
announced Soviet doctrine to retaliate against 
any use of nuclear weaponry in Europe by a 
strategic strike against European and North 
American targets. Thus are welded together 
in reality the previously compartmentalized 
trieosies of "first use and "second strike". 
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Difficult as it would have been for any of 
us only a year ago even to anticipate, 
strategic nuclear weapons issues are 
becoming increasingly irrelevant in the US- 
USSR relationship and thus increasingly less 
contentious. This means that UK and French 
inventories will attract increasing attention. 
A massive exchange employing a large 
percentage of the currently available firepower 
has, of course, always been beyond any 
rational contemplation nor has any scenario 
included such. Figure 2 conveys some sense 
of the reason why. The single dot in the 
centre square represents all the firepower 
expended in World War 11, a grand total of 3 
megatons. The other dots in their entirety 
represent the world's nuclear arsenal as of 
mid-1986. The changes since have yet to 
decrease significantly the numbers. As of 
November 30, 1989, the United States 
possessed 1,899 launchers carrying 12,570 
warheads; the USSR numbers were 2,488 
launchers with 10,988 warheads. (Numbers 
are based on the counting rules established at 
the December, 1987, US-USSR Summit in 
Washington.) That arsenal is the equivalent 
of 6,000 World War Its - 18,000 megatons. 
The top left circle of three dots - 9 megatons, 
or 3 World War Its - represents the weapons 
deployed on one US Poseidon submarine. 
The circle in the lower left hand corner 
represents 24 megatons, the firepower of a 
single US Trident I submarine. That firepower 
increases significantly with the introduction, 
now beginning, of the much more powerful 
Trident 11 D-5 missiles. Any two squares on 
the chart contain 300 megatons - enough 
destructive capacity to destroy every large and 
medium size city in the entire world. 
Part of the drama associated with the 
signing of the INF treaty by presidents 
Gorbachev and Reagan flows from the fact 
that prior thereto no new multilateral arms- 
control treaty had come into effect since 1981 
(the Inhumane Weapons convention) and with 
a single, regional exception (South Pacific), no 
multilateral nuclear weapon convention had 




1971. The last US-USSR nuclear arms 
agreement had been SALT 11, signed June 18, 
1979, but not ratified by the United States. 
Most arms control activity was in reverse and 
is only now turning positive. The US had 
exceeded the SALT II limits in 1987, for 
example, and the Reagan Administration had 
subjected the 1972 ABM Treaty to narrow re- 
interpretation while mufti-billion dollar R and D 
efforts were launched on the SDI. Both 
superpowers have been engaged until recently 
in immense naval build-ups (including the 
Soviet Union's first fixed-wing aircraft carrier) 
most of which is not subject to any arms 
control constraints. Only in recent weeks has 
the United States abandoned, so far by 
implication, the Weinberger goal of a 600-ship 
navy. 
. This entire environment is now extremely 
fluid and more promising than at any time 
since the advent of the nuclear age. The 
Soviet Union has reversed a considerable 
measure of its long-time resistance to western 
demands for proof of compliance. The INF 
Treaty provides for verification, not simply by 
remote-sensing satellite techniques (which 
have improved immensely in quality in recent 
years), but as well by the hitherto unthinkable 
method of "intrusive verification." The treaty 
provides as well not just for de-activating or 
mothballing (with all of the fears of deception 
and revival that flow from previous arms- 
control efforts as long ago as the 1922, 1930, 
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and 1935 Washington and London naval 
conference disarmament agreements) but for 
actual destruction of weapons - again subject 
to on-site verification. It was the Soviet 
reversal of attitude toward intrusive verification 
that prompted Secretary Schultz to say that 
the US should not be frightened of accepting 
"yes" for an answer. And thus the INF 
Treaty provides for a Special Verification 
Commission. With some fits and starts the 
Ottawa proposals for Open-Skies inspections 
seem once again to be possible. And in 
Washington in June, verification protocols 
were signed to each of the Threshold Test 
Ban Treaty and the PNE Treaty. The way 
now seems clear for United States Senate 
approval to ratify each. In a few days, the 
penultimate review conference of the NPT will 
get underway. It will be the second last 
chance to strengthen and perpetuate this vital 
but woefully inadequate treaty. 
With common sense, imagination, 
determination - and a measure of luck - we 
may yet find our way through the nuclear 
maze. We will not, however, be beyond our 
military predicament, nor will we be until there 
is much broader awareness of the limitations 
of military responses to non-military 
circumstances. 
The military environment forms an integral 
part of any discussions about economic 
development both North and South, about 
preferred forms of social structure, about 
issues of conflict resolution, and about policies 
of resource allocation. It is a category too 
sophisticated to be governed by uninformed 
emotion; it is at the same time a category so 
critical to continued human existence that it 
cannot be left in default to technologists and 
think-tank participants -- those who until 
recently dominated the field. 
CONCLUSION 
What are the prospects for the human 
race? Will we be wafted off into glorious 
tomorrows on the buoyancy of micro- 
electronics and bioengineering? Or will we 
sink into a stifling quagmire of contradictory 
political opinions, or worse? Are there 
normative ingredients for a preferred future of 
a kind which permits measurement of 
progress? I believe that there are, indeed 
that there must be if we are to proceed 
towards a functioning, cooperative, and self- 
sustaining international community. By my 
calculation, they are five in number: 
1) The existence and preservation of a 
wholesome natural environment; 
2) Economically resilient and politically 
stable democracies; 
3) A strong and equitable international 
trading and monetary system; 
4) Accepted and institutionalized 
mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of 
disputes; 
5) A dedication on the part of all major 
actors to an enhancement of human dignity, 
and an understanding on the part of the 
privileged what that means. 
Pipe-dream? Far from it. Cold-blooded, 
hard-nosed realism. Never before has 
humanity toyed with circumstances leading to 
irremedial error: nuclear error, environmental 
error, economic error. All are of a potential 
magnitude which makes them qualitatively 
different from any previous fault-fines. The 
human race must avoid what sometimes 
appears to be lemming-like possession of an 
irreversible momentum towards these 
irremedial errors. 
Any one of these categories could be 
cataclysmic in itself. Unfortunately, each 
tends to inter-act with the others to make 
problem-solving more challenging, to make 
humility more necessary. Yet humility is not 
often evident today, not even in the face of 
staggering technological disasters. Too often 
the response to Challenger and Chernobyl is 
to place even more reliance on technology, 
even less on common sense and 
humanitarian instincts, to forget that political 
issues are, at their core, moral issues. How 
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much of our apparent indifference is a product 
of our inability to measure, and how much our 
unwillingness to cry out? The time frames 
within which some of these slow-moving 
events are evolving are no longer beyond our 
comprehension; the possibility of error 
becomes ever more evident notwithstanding 
the unforgivable attempts to maintain secrecy. 
The Soviets delayed for days an 
acknowledgement of the full extent of the 
Chernobyl accident, and were roundly 
criticized worldwide. The British Government 
chose not to disclose the extent of radiation 
leakage at Windscale in 1957 because it 
feared criticism. The United States 
Government, it is now known, has on several 
occasions failed to inform potential victims of 
hazardous circumstances. These always on 
the ground of national security. These are 
costs that democratic societies - dependent as 
they are on transparent, accountable 
governments - cannot sustain indefinitely. 
The United States Government last week, for 
example, conceded that the cost of cleaning 
up the nuclear weapons factory sites may well 
be as much as US$200 billion in the next 20 
years - the most expensive public works 
project in the history of that country. 
Prior to her death a few years ago, 
Barbara Ward warned of the momentum of 
events. She wrote: "The door of the future 
is opening onto a crisis more sudden, more 
global, more inescapable, more bewildering 
than any ever encountered by the human 
species. And one which will take decisive 
shape within the life span of children who are 
already born...." In 1987, Prime Minister 
Brundtland introduced her Commission's report 
with the observation that current environmental 
changes "outstrip our present ability to cope; 
our financial and political institutions are out of 
step with the workings of nature." 
Expressed that way, time assumes a more 
vital quality, a precious worth. 
Virtually all of the world's great military 
strategists from the 4th century BC Chinese, 
Sun Tzu, onward have advocated the 
necessity of limiting the use of armed force, of 
inflicting the least possible casualties, and of 
engaging in force only if a state's objectives 
could not be achieved by other means. Yet 
the 20th century record is dismal. World War 
I introduced the concept of unconditional 
surrender. World War II employed the 
concept of total war. Today, neither 
solemnly concluded international treaties nor 
the most respected of religious teachings 
stand in the way of military planners who 
have targeted nuclear warheads at centres of 
population, who demand ever more lethal 
weapons of mass and indiscriminate 
destructive capability. The closely reasoned 
message of the United States Catholic 
Bishops has thus challenged the concept of 
"just war," supported by the church since the 
rule of Constantine. The Bishops opted in the 
nuclear age for the more general Christian 
ethic of "non-violence." 
As the new Europe unfolds, all actors 
must accept that stable defence systems 
demand two ingredients; two that I have 
championed on this platform for at least 10 
years. The two are deterrence and 
reassurance. Deterrence is the effective 
discouragement of resort to war; the 
knowledge that the commencement of 
hostilities will result in a military response 
which would inflict unacceptable punishment. 
Reassurance - the element never even 
mentioned by NATO until this spring - is the 
maintenance of self-confidence within each 
alliance that one's own and one's adversary's 
military strength is adequate and intended to 
defend. If that vital balance between 
deterrence and reassurance is lost - and we 
have been close to losing it - the necessary 
political foundation for NATO will collapse, as 
will our common security. 
Closeted as each of us is with an ever- 
increasing number of people on a planet of 
finite size, we must realize that the human 
race cannot survive if arrogant absolutes are 
to become national policies. The world is a 
pluralistic community. Concepts of religious or 
racial or nationalist superiority are as 
dangerous as they are fallacious. 
How shall I close this all-too-lengthy 
lecture? With the same words I have used in 
the past. 
The world we live in today is a much 
more complex place than yesterday's world. 
It is a world of dysfunction, disequilibrium, and 
discontinuity. Above all it is a world of inter- 
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dependence and mutuality of vulnerability in 
which no nation is able to withdraw or to act 
with impunity. The age of easy answers and 
grand designs is well behind us. The need 
carefully to balance avalanches of data, to 
assess the impact of a spectrum of 
alternatives, to consider the interests of a 
multitude of parties, this is the tedious but 
essential path through the minefields ahead. 
That path can be negotiated without question. 
But to do so we must look forward and 
abandon once and for all concepts of total 
victory and total surrender, be they economic, 
political, or military. We exist today in a world 
where zero-sum games belong only in the 
computer arcades. In the real world, in every 
international field of activity, we all win, or we 
all will perish. Peter Drucker once wrote: 
No one needs to be told that our age is 
an age of infinite peril. No one needs to 
be told that the central question we face 
with respect to man's future is not what it 
shall be, but whether it shall be. 
(emphasis added) 
He then continues, and emphasizes that the 
requirements of our age are "tasks of today, 
and not tasks for the year 2000. But they are 
the tasks to which we have to address 
ourselves to deserve tomorrow." 
As you begin a challenging year in this 
remarkable place, preparing yourselves to set 
foot on the path to tomorrow, I wish you well. 
You have been given a rare opportunity. I 
urge you to draw a long bow, to take a long 
look, to be conscious of time, and to be true 
to your humane instincts. 
